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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

ROBERT DESPAIN,
Defendant/Appellant
v.

:

Amended Brief

:

Appellate Case No. 20060769-CA

:

Priority No. : 2

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee.

:

BRIEF OF APPELLANT/DEFENDANT

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to U.C.A. 77-18a-l
and U.C.A. 78-2a-3(e) (1953 as amended).
STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
ISSUE # 1: Did the arresting officer, Deputy Spotten, have probable cause to
arrest the Defendant for Driving Under the Influence based on the Defendant's erratic
driving pattern, the single car accident with a stationary trailer, the Defendant's panicked
and paranoid demeanor, and the Defendant's allegedly slurred speech, absent an odor of
alcohol or marijuana or others signs that the Defendant had consumed or was under the
influence of drugs or alcohol?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: 'This court reviews a trial court's legal
determination of probable cause for correctness, affording some discretion to the trial

and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, denying Defendant's Motions to Suppress
Evidence, as well as the subsequent entry of his conviction and sentence for Possession
of a Controlled Substance, a Third Degree felony, and Driving Under the Influence, a
Class B Misdemeanor, entered as a result of the Defendant's guilty plea pursuant to State
v. Serv, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah Ct.App.1988) It is the position of the Appellant that the trial
court erred in denying the Defendant's Motions to Suppress Evidence Based on Lack of
Probable Cause to Arrest and Improper Inventory Search.
Course of Proceedings Below:
The Defendant was arrested on May 6, 2004, after the Defendant was involved in
a single car accident. The Defendant was placed under arrest for DUI and pursuant to the
Defendant's arrest for DUI, the Defendant's vehicle was impounded and an inventory
search was conducted. During the search of the Defendant's vehicle officers discovered a
backpack which contained methamphetamine, marijuana, and drug paraphernalia. The
Defendant was subsequently charged with Count 1, Possession of a Controlled Substance
with the Intent to Distribute, a Second Degree Felony, Count 2, Possession of a
Controlled Substance with the Intent to Distribute, a Third Degree Felony, Count 3,
Driving Under the Influence, a Class B Misdemeanor, and Count 4, Possession of Drug
Paraphernalia, a Class B Misdemeanor.
The Defendant waived his right to a preliminary hearing, entered a plea of not
guilty and an Evidentiary Hearing on the Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence was
set for April 11, 2005. Prior to the evidentiary hearing the parties filed numerous
4

pleadings. On March 1, 2005, the Defendant filed his Motion and Memorandum to
Suppress Evidence. On March 15, 2005, the State filed the State's Memorandum
Opposing Defendant's Motion to Suppress. On March 15, 2005, the Defendant filed his
Objection to State's Memorandum Opposing Defendant's Motion to Suppress and
Motion to Strike. On March 18, 2005, the Defendant filed his reply to State's
Memorandum Opposing Motion to Suppress Evidence. At the April 11, 2005,
Evidentiary Hearing, the court heard testimony from 2 witnesses, Deputy Edward
Spotten, and Sgt. Jason Mazuran. Following the Evidentiary Hearing, the court gave the
parties an opportunity to file Supplemental Memorandum to address the evidence
presented at the evidentiary hearing. On April 25, 2005, the Defendant filed his
Supplemental Motion and Memorandum to Suppress Evidence. On May 9, 2005, the
state filed the State's Memorandum Opposing Defendant's Motion to Suppress.
After receiving and reviewing all pleadings filed by the parties as well as an
unofficial transcript of the evidentiary hearing, the Court denied the Defendant's Motion
to Suppress. After several drafts, the Court finally signed the Second Amended Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order on December 15, 2005. Following the entry of
the Court's Order denying the Defendant's Motion to Suppress, on January 5, 2006, the
Defendant filed his Petition for Permission to Appeal from an Interlocutory Order which
was subsequently denied by the Utah Court of Appeals on February 8, 2006. Following
the Denial of the Petition for Interlocutory Appeal, on April 28, 2006, the Defendant
entered a plea of guilty to Possession of a Controlled Substance, a Third Degree felony,
5

car and that the Defendant was acting paranoid about his vehicle. (Transcript pg. 22-23)
Sergeant Jason Mazuran also assisted in the investigation. Sgt. Mazuran described the
Defendant's behavior as panicked however when the Defendant told Sgt. Mazuran that he
had called someone to come get him, a family member, Sgt. Mazuran told him "that was
fine." (Transcript pg. 37)

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
It is the Defendant's first contention that the trial court erred in denying the
Defendant's pre-trial Motion to Suppress on the ground that the arresting officer lacked
probable cause to arrest the Defendant for DUI. Although the Defendant had been
involved in an accident, officers had not observed sufficient facts that would have
reasonably led the officers to believe that the Defendant was under the influence of drugs
and/or alcohol prior to arresting him for DUI. In order to make an arrest for DUI, the
arresting officer must have reason to believe that the Defendant was under the influence
of drugs and/or alcohol. Absent a reasonable belief that the Defendant was under the
influence of drugs and/or alcohol the officers lacked probable cause to arrest the
Defendant for DUI. Furthermore, the only legal authority the officers had for
impounding and conducting an inventory search of the Defendant's vehicle was based on
his arrest for DUI. Therefore absent probable cause to arrest the Defendant for DUI, the
inventory search of the Defendant's vehicle was illegal and any evidenced seized during
the inventory search should have been suppressed as well as any other evidence obtained
8

following the Defendant's arrest including inculpatory statements and the results of the
Defendant's chemical test.
The Defendant's second contention is that the trial Court erred in finding that the
inevitable discovery doctrine was applicable in this case to excuse the illegal inventory
search of the Defendant's vehicle. The trial court found that the State had failed to
present sufficient evidence to show that the "inventory search" of the Defendant's vehicle
was done properly pursuant to the Salt Lake County Sheriffs standardized
impound/inventory search policy and procedure. Despite the Court's conclusion that the
State had failed to show that the inventory search conducted at the scene was conducted
properly and according to the standardized policy, the Court found that "had the vehicle
been towed to the impound lot and a proper inventory search been conducted, the
contraband would have been inevitably discovered." It is the position of the Defendant
that the Court's application of the inevitable discovery doctrine under the facts and
circumstances of this case was improper due to the fact that the search that led to the
discovery of the drugs and paraphernalia was the illegal inventory search. Under the
circumstances of this case, the inventory search was the final search, the end of the road
so to speak, and there would not have been any further independent reason or basis for an
additional search following the improperly conducted inventory search at the scene. This
is evidenced by the fact that no further searches were conducted on the Defendant's
vehicle after the botched inventory search at the scene. Likewise even if a second proper
inventory search had been conducted, any evidence obtained during the initial improper
9

inventory search must still be suppressed. Therefore, pursuant to State v. Giron, 943 P.2d
1114,1117 (Utah App. 1997), which requires that a police agency adopt a standardized
policy and procedure for conducting inventory searches of vehicles and that officers
conducting an inventory search must follow the standardized policy and procedure
adopted by the agency, the search of the Defendant's vehicle in this case was illegal and
any evidence seized during the course of the improper inventory search should have been
suppressed.

ARGUMENT
I.

DEPUTY SPOTTEN LACKED PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST
THE DEFENDANT AT THE SCENE FOR DRIVING UNDER THE
INFLUENCE IN VIOLATION OF U.C.A. § 41-6-44 OR WHILE
DRIVING WITH A MEASURABLE AMOUNT OF METABOLITE
IN THE BODY IN VIOLATION OF U.C.A. § 41-6-44.6

It is the position of the Defendant that the arresting officer did not have probable
cause to place the Defendant under arrest for Driving Under the Influence and therefore
the officer obtained evidence in violation of the Defendant's constitutional rights
pursuant to the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I,
Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. Probable cause is met when "whether from the facts
known to the officer, and the inferences which fairly may be drawn therefrom, a
reasonable and prudent person in [the arresting officer's] position would be justified in
believing that [the driver] had committed the offense." Lavton City v. Noon, 736 P.2d
1035, 1037 (Utah 1987). "Probable cause exists where 'the facts and circumstances
10

within [the officers'] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy
information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a [personolice office] of reasonable
caution in the belief that 'an offense has been or is being committed." State v. Dorsev,
731 P.2d 1085, 1088 (Utah 1986)(quoting Brinagar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175176, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 1310-11, 93 L.Ed 1879 (1949)).
Furthermore, the determination of probable cause to arrest is an "objective"
standard based on a totality of the circumstnaces known to the officer at the time he made
the decision to place the suspect under arrest.
As required by the Fourth Amendment, to justify a wrrantless arrest
"an officer must have probabel cause . . . 'to believe that the supsect
has committed or is committing an offense.'" Id. at ^ 26 (citation
omitted). Probable cuase determinations are reviewed un an
"objective standard: whther from the facts known to the officer, and
the inferences [that can] fairly . . . be drawn therefrom, a reasonable
and prudent person in [the officer's] position would be justified in
believing that the suspect had committed the offense'" for which he
was arrested. Id. at f 27 (alterations in original)(quoting State v.
Cole, 674 P.2d 119, 125 (Utah 1983)(additional citatiosn omitted)).
IN other words, "we examine the events leading up to the arrest, and
then decide 'whether these historical facts, viewed from the
standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer, amoutn to
'probable cause." Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 124 S.Ct. 795,
800, 157 L.Ed.2d 769 (2003)(citation omitted).
However, we do not examine these facts in isolation, but rather we
examine the totality of the circumstances to determine whether " 'a
prudent person, or one of reasonable caution [would believe based
upon the] circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed, is
committing, or is about to commit'ft the offence for which he is
arrestedChansamone, 2003 UT App 107 at f 1L 69 P.3d 293
(quoting Trane, 2002 UT 97 at If 27, 57
1052).
State v. Hechtle. 89 P.3d 185, 188-89 (Utah App.2004)
11

According to Deputy Spotten's testimony on direct examination at the evidentiary
hearing, "based on the fact that he had crashed, based on the information received from
witnesses, um I came to the conclusion that, that he was under the influence of
something. That was my, my I have probable cause to believe so and was going to effect
a DUI arrest..." (Transcript pg. 8) Likewise, according to the DUI Summons and
Citation prepared by Deputy Spotten in this case, the Defendant was cited and arrested
for either a violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (DUI) or Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.6
(DUI Metabolite). Thus the determination made by the District Court and to be reviewed
by this Court is whether or not there was sufficient probable cause to arrest the Defendant
for DUI.
Under Utah law, an officer may arrest an individual for Driving Under the
Influence in violation of Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44 when the officer has probable cause
to believe the driver has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater
or that the driver "is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined influence
of alcohol and any drug to a degree that renders the person incapable of safely operating
a vehicle." Likewise, Under Utah Code Ann. §44-6-44.6, more commonly referred to as
the "DUI Metabolite" statute, a "person may not operate or be in actual physical control
of a motor vehicle within this state if the person has any measurable controlled substance
or metabolite of a controlled substance in the person's body." Thus a police officer may
only arrest an individual for a violation of Utah Code Ann. §44-6-44.6 when the officer
has probable cause to believe the driver of a vehicle has a "measurable controlled
12

substance or metabolite of a controlled substance in the person's body. " Therefore, in
order for an officer to arrest a suspect for DUI, the officer must have reason to believe
that the suspect is "under the influence" of drugs and/or alcohol. Absent a reasonable
belief that the suspect is "under the influence" of drugs and/or alcohol, an officer may
have probable cause to arrest the suspect for another crime but he does not have probable
cause to make an arrest for DUI.
In the present case, Deputy Spotten testified that at the time he made up his mind
to arrest the Defendant for DUI, he hadn't seen any signs of either alcohol consumption
or drug consumption. On cross examination, Deputy Spotten engaged in the following
exchange with defense counsel:
Schatz:

So at that point it was your primary determination that you were going
to arrest him for DUI, based on the erratic driving pattern?

Officer:

After I had spoken with the witnesses, and uh, the fact that the crash
didn't make any sense, why someone would crash into a parked trailer
at the side of the road with no other contributing circumstances. Yes.

Schatz:

Kay. But you hadn't seen any signs of alcohol consumption or
drug consumption at that point had you?

Officer:

I did not.

(Transcript pg. 15)

It appears as though Deputy Spotten's decision to arrest the Defendant was based
entirely on the driving pattern and the resulting crash. Clearly this information is not
sufficient to support probable cause to arrest for DUI as a critical element of either a
standard DUI or a Metabolite DUI is the consumption of drugs or alcohol and that the
13

driver is "under the influence" at the time of driving. During the course of the hearing,
Deputy Spotten testified that his belief was further supported by his alleged observation
that the Defendant's speech was slurred and the opinion of EMT's on the scene that the
Defendant appeared to be acting "paranoid" since the Defendant had expressed concern
about securing his belongings inside his vehicle. However, Deputy Spotten also testified
that he did not observe the odor of alcohol or any illegal drugs such as marijuana, the
Defendant denied consuming any drugs or alcohol when specifically asked, Deputy
Spotten did not observe any problems with the Defendant's ability to balance, and he did
not observe any other common physical characteristics of drug or alcohol consumption
such as red, glossy, droopy, or watery eyes, flushed face, relaxed facial tones, etc. He
simply assumed that the accident could not have occurred if the Defendant was not under
the influence.
The State argued that Deputy Spotten had probable cause to arrest the Defendant
for Driving Under the Influence of a controlled substance because witnesses observed the
Defendant driving erratically before the accident and emergency personnel told Deputy
Spotten that the Defendant kept worrying about objects inside his vehicle. These are the
only factors the State presented to establish probable cause to arrest the Defendant for
DUI. These factors alone are clearly insufficient to establish probable cause to arrest the
Defendant for Driving Under the Influence of alcohol or a controlled substance. The fact
that the Defendant was driving erratically does not clearly indicate that he was under the
influence. There are numerous reasons why a person may drive erratically or even be
14

involved in an accident which having nothing to do with drugs or alcohol. A person may
drive poorly if they were late for work, if they were suffering from a lack of sleep, or if
they were talking on a cell phone. The State also argued that the Defendant was acting
"paranoid" and kept worrying about objects in his vehicle. The fact that the Defendant
was concerned about objects in his vehicle before it was towed away from the scene after
an accident is normal. The Defendant may have had a lap top computer, school work,
CD's or other valuables in his backpack that he did not want to be lost or left in his
vehicle when it was towed to the storage yard.
It is important to note that Deputy Spotten specifically stated that the arrest was
only for DUI. He did not indicate that the Defendant was being arrested for any other
offense therefore the court's decision on whether or not there was probable cause to arrest
must be limited to evaluating whether there was probable cause to arrest the Defendant
for DUI (Pursuant to either Utah Code Ann. 41-6-44 or 41-6-44.6) and not any other
offense. What is particularly relevant in this case is not what the officers observed but
what they did not observe. Deputy Spotten did not notice an odor of alcohol or marijuana
coming from the Defendant. Deputy Spotten did not observe any physical signs that the
Defendant had ingested alcohol or a controlled substance. Deputy Spotten did not
observe any drugs or contraband in plain view, and when he asked the Defendant if he
had been using drugs the Defendant replied "No". Deputy Spotten did not conduct any
field sobriety tests and did not note in his report that he observed anything abnormal
about the Defendant's eyes or his balance.
15

The determination of probable cause to arrest requires that the Court take a totality
of the circumstances approach. Taking a "totality of the circumstances approach" and
taking into account all of the factors observed by Deputy Spotten as well as those he did
not observe, there was not sufficient evidence known to Deputy Spotten while he was at
the scene of the accident that would lead "a reasonable and prudent person in [the
arresting officer's] position" to believe that Mr. Despain was operating a vehicle while
under the influence of a controlled substance. Deputy Spotten himself testified that he
"hadn't seen any signs of alcohol consumption or drug consumption" at the point he
made his determination he was going to arrest the Defendant for DUI (Transcript pg. 15)
Therefore absent a reasonable belief that the Defendant had consumed drugs or alcohol,
Deputy Spotten lacked probable cause to arrest the Defendant for DUI. Although he may
have had probable cause to cite the Defendant for Reckless Driving or Negligent
Collision, he did not have probable cause to arrest him for DUI.

II.

THE INEVITABLE DISCOVERY DOCTRINE IS NOT
APPLICABLE UNDER THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF
THIS CASE TO EXCUSE THE IMPROPER INVENTORY SEARCH

Even if this Court finds that there was probable cause to arrest the Defendant for
DUI, it is the position of the Defendant that the "inventory search" of the Defendant's
vehicle was improperly conducted, as correctly determined by the District Court, but the
District Court erred in concluding that the inevitable discovery doctrine applied to excuse
the improper inventory search.
16

Based on the findings of fact entered by the District Court, the District Court
Came to the legal conclusion that "3. The State's theory of 'search incident to lawful
arrest' was not consistent with Utah case law." Despite the conclusion that the search of
the Defendant's vehicle was not justified under the "search incident to lawful arrest"
exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement, the Court found that "4.
There was probable cause to impound the car pursuant to U.C.A. § 41-6-44.6 and U.C.A
§ 41-6-44.30." Thus, the Court determined that the search of the Defendant's vehicle
was properly undertaken as an "inventory search" but went on to conclude that "7. The
State has failed to carry its burden of showing that the inventory search was properly
carried out." However, even though the Court concluded that the "inventory search" was
not carried out properly, the Court finally concluded that the inevitable discovery
doctrine was applicable. The Court reached the ultimate legal conclusion that "8.
However, had the vehicle been towed to the impound lot an a proper inventory search
been conducted, the contraband would have been inevitably discovered."
The Courts application of inevitable discovery doctrine in this case was improper
under the facts and circumstances of this particular case. The basic principle of the
inevitable discovery doctrine is that evidence obtained during an illegal search may still
be admissible if the prosecution can prove that even had the illegal search not taken
place, the evidence would have been "inevitably" discovered by other independent legal
means. In State v. Topanotes, 76 P. 3d. 1159 (Utah 2003), the Utah Supreme Court
discussed the application of the inevitable discovery doctrine. The Court wrote that:
17

The exclusionary rule prohibits the use at trial of evidence, both
primary and derivative (the "fruit of unlawful police misconduct"),
obtained in violation of an individual's constitutional and statutory
rights. Nix v.Williams. 467 U.S. 431, 442-43, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 81
L.Ed.2d 377 (1984)

The inevitable discovery doctrine at issue in this case is similar to the
independent source doctrine; it enables courts to look to the facts and
circumstances surrounding the discovery of the tainted evidence and
asks whether the police would have discovered the evidence despite
the illegality. "If the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of
the evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably would have
been discovered by lawful means . . . then the deterrence rationale
has so little basis that the evidence should be received. Nix, 467
U.S. at 444, 104 S.Ct. 2501.
State v. Topanotes. 76 P. 3d. 1159, 1162 (Utah 2003)
The Court went on to discuss the requirement of an "independent source" or
"independent investigation" which would have led to the discovery of the illegally
obtained evidence.
A crucial element of the inevitable discovery is independence; there
must be some "independent basis for discovery," Boatwright, 822
F.2d at 865, and "the investigation that inevitably would have led to
the evidence [must] be independent of the constitutional violation,"
Larsen, 127 F.3d at 987. Thus, "the fact or likelihood that makes the
discovery inevitable [must] arise from circumstances other than those
disclosed by the illegal search itself." Boatwright, 822 F.2d at 86465. For courts confidently to predict what would have occurred, but
did not actually occur, there must be persuasive evidence of events or
circumstances apart from those resulting in illegal police activity that
would have inevitably led to discovery. Routine or standard police
procedures are often a compelling and reliable foundation for
inevitable discovery, even if not part of a separate, concurrent
investigation. For example, police searches that would occur after
the evidence is legally in their custody, such as routine inventory
searches of vehicles impounded after the driver is arrested, are often
18

persuasive evidence of potential independent sources of discovery.
See, e.g. United States v. Seals, 987 F.2d 1102, 1107-08 (5th
Cir.1993); United States v. Horn. 970 F.2d 728, 732 (10th Cir.1992)
State v. Topanotes. 76 P. 3d. 1159, 1163 (Utah 2003)

In the present case, the District Court ruled that the State had failed to show that
the inventory search of the Defendant's vehicle was carried out properly according to
policy. As such, pursuant to the Utah Court of Appeals ruling in State v. Giron, 943 P.2d
1114 (Utah App.1997) any evidence obtained during an improper and therefore illegal
inventory search should have been suppressed. However, despite finding that the
inventory search of Defendant's vehicle was not proper, the District Court applied the
inevitable discovery doctrine to excuse the illegal inventory search and admit the
evidence. The District Court's reasoning for doing so was that "had the vehicle been
towed to the impound lot and a proper inventory search been conducted, the contraband
would have been inevitably discovered." The District Court's conclusion that the
evidence was admissible as it would have been inevitably discovered is fundamentally
flawed for two reasons.
First, as set forth above, in order for the inevitable discovery doctrine to apply, the
Court must find that there was some other "independent investigation" or "independent
source" which would have led to the discovery of the evidence separate from the illegal
search. In the present case the District Court has not identified any other "independent
investigation" or "independent source" which would have led to the discovery of the
evidence separate from an inventory search of the Defendant's vehicle. The Court
19

improperly assumes that there was or would have been a second inventory search
conducted at the impound lot. The evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing does not
support such an assumption. To the contrary, there was no evidence presented at the
evidentiary hearing in this matter from which the District Court could reasonably have
concluded that the officers intended to or did in fact conduct a second inventory search
after the Defendant's vehicle was towed to the impound lot.
As the Supreme Court pointed out in Topanotes, "Routine or standard police
procedures are often a compelling and reliable foundation for inevitable discovery, even
if not part of a separate, concurrent investigation. For example, police searches that
would occur after the evidence is legally in their custody, such as routine inventory
searches of vehicles impounded after the driver is arrested, are often persuasive evidence
of potential independent sources of discovery." Topanotes, at 1163 (emphasis added)
The Supreme Court found that an inventory search would often serve as the basis for
finding that the evidence would have been inevitably discovered during a subsequent
inventory search. In other words, the inventory search typically acts as the final
opportunity for evidence to be discovered by legal means because it is typically the last
search conducted on the vehicle. In the present case it is the inventory search itself that
the District Court found was improper. The inventory search in this case was the final
opportunity the officers had to search the Defendant's vehicle. In this case, they chose to
take that opportunity at the scene and in doing so they failed to follow proper procedure
in conducting the inventory search which resulted in the discovery of the evidence the
20

Defendant sought to have suppressed. So unless the prosecution has established that the
vehicle would have been searched as a result of some other "independent investigation"
or "independent source" separate from the improper inventory search, any evidence
obtained during the improper inventory search must be suppressed. The prosecution
presented no evidence whatsoever that there was any sort of "independent investigation"
or other "independent sources" that would have led to a search of the Defendant's
vehicle. According to the testimony of the offices the search was being carried out as an
inventory search due to the fact that the Defendant's vehicle was to be impounded as a
result of his arrest for DUI. They were not investigating the Defendant for drug activity
or in the process of obtaining a search warrant based on other information. Therefore the
State has failed to establish that absent the illegal inventory search, the evidence would
have been inevitably discovered as the result of any other "independent investigation" or
"independent source" thus the inevitable discovery doctrine is inapplicable under the
facts and circumstances of this case.
Secondly, even under the Court's assumption that there somehow would have
been a second proper inventory search conducted on the vehicle after it had been towed
to the impound lot and during a subsequent proper inventory search the contraband would
have been inevitably discovered, this does not excuse the prior illegal inventory search at
the scene and allow for the admission of the evidence discovered during the initial illegal
inventory search at the scene. The District Court's final legal conclusion contained in
paragraph # 8 seems to imply that officers would always be allowed to correct an initial
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improper inventory search at the scene where the evidence was illegally discovered by
towing the vehicle to an impound lot and conducting a second proper inventory search at
a later time. Such a conclusion is contrary to the Utah Court of Appeals ruling in Giron
which ruled that evidence that was obtained during an improperly carried out inventory
search must be suppressed based on the officer's failure to follow proper procedure in
conducting the inventory search which actually resulted in the discovery of the evidence.
In Giron, there were in fact two inventory searches done. The first search was
conducted by Officer Bench who made the initial traffic stop on the Defendant's vehicle.
During Officer Bench's search he located several items of evidence of drugs and
paraphernalia which the Defendant later moved to suppress. The Court found that the
search by Officer Bench was not conducted according to Salt Lake City's inventory
search policy and therefore was an illegal search. The State argued that the illegality of
Officer Bench's initial inventory search was obviated by a second search later conducted
by Officer Russell who did follow the proper procedure for conducting an inventory
search. The Court found that the later, yet proper, search by Officer Russell was
irrelevant. The Court of Appeals upheld the District Court's ruling that the State failed to
show that the inventory search conducted by Officer Bench, which resulted in the
discovery of the evidence, was not done properly therefore any evidence obtained during
the inventory search conducted by Officer Bench was obtained in violation of the
Defendant's Fourth Amendment rights and was therefore inadmissible under the
inventory search regardless of whether or not Officer Russell's later inventory search was
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conducted properly.1
Thus, although there was absolutely no evidence presented from which the Court
could reasonably have concluded that a second inventory search was done or would have
been done in the present case, even if a second inventory search had been done and even
if that second inventory search would have been conducted properly according to the Salt
Lake County Sheriffs policy and procedure governing inventory searches, the propriety
of the second search would not have excused the illegality of the initial improper
inventory search at the scene and any evidence obtained during the initial improper
inventory search must still be suppressed.

CONCLUSION
Based on the reasons set forth above the Defendant respectfully requests that the
Court reverse the District Court's ruling that the officers had probable cause to arrest the
Defendant for DUI in this case and rule that any evidence obtained by officers following
the Defendant's arrest for DUI be suppressed. The Defendant further requests that this
Court rule that the District Court erred in applying the inevitable discovery doctrine in
this case and rule that any evidence obtained during the search of the Defendant's vehicle
also be suppressed. Finally, based on the suppression of the evidence as requested, the

1

Although the Court of Appeals upheld the District Court's ruling that the inventory search conducted by Officer
Bench was invalid and that the evidence obtained during the inventory search could not be admitted pursuant to the
inventory search, the Court of Appeals remanded the case to the District Court for further proceedings to determine
if the search was a constitutionally reasonable search incident to a lawful arrest.
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Defendant moves this Court to reverse his convictions for Possession of a Controlled
Substance and Driving Under the Influence and order that both charges be dismissed.
DATED this day, December 15, 2006.

Jason Schatz
Attorney for Defendant
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Addendum A

United States Constitution, Amendment IV
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Utah Constitution Article I, Section 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden —
Issuance of warrant.]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but
upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the person or thing to be seized.

41-6-44.6 Definitions - Driving with any measurable controlled substance in the
body - Penalties - Arrest without warrant.
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Controlled substance" means any substance scheduled under Section 58-37-4 .
(b) "Practitioner" has the same meaning as provided in Section 58-37-2 .
(c) "Prescribe" has the same meaning as provided in Section 58-37-2 .
(d) "Prescription" has the same meaning as provided in Section 58-37-2 .
(2) In cases not amounting to a violation of Section 41-6-44 , a person may not operate or
be in actual physical control of a motor vehicle within this state if the person has any
measurable controlled substance or metabolite of a controlled substance in the person's
body.
(3) It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under this section that the controlled
substance was involuntarily ingested by the accused or prescribed by a practitioner for
use by the accused.
(4) A person convicted of a violation of Subsection (2) is guilty of a class B
misdemeanor.
(5) A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person for a violation of this section
when the officer has probable cause to believe the violation has occurred, although not in
the officer's presence, and if the officer has probable cause to believe that the violation
was committed by the person.
(6) The Driver License Division shall:

(a) suspend, for 90 days, the driver license of a person convicted under Subsection (2);
(b) revoke, for one year, the driver license of a person convicted of a second or
subsequent offense under Subsection (2) or if the person has a prior conviction as defined
under Subsection 41-6-44 (1), if the violation is committed within a period often years
after the date of the prior violation; and
(c) subtract from any suspension or revocation period the number of days for which a
license was previously suspended under Section 53-3-223 or 53-3-231 , if the previous
suspension was based on the same occurrence upon which the record of conviction is
based.
(7) If a person fails to complete all court ordered screening and assessment, educational
series, and substance abuse treatment, or fails to pay all fines and fees, including fees for
restitution and treatment costs, the court shall notify the Driver License Division of a
failure to comply. Upon receiving the notification, the division shall suspend the person's
driving privilege in accordance with Subsections 53-3-221 (2) and (3).
(8) The court shall order supervised probation in accordance with Subsection 41-6-44(14)
for a person convicted under Subsection (2).
41-6-44 Driving under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of both or
with specified or unsafe blood alcohol concentration - Measurement of blood or
breath alcohol - Criminal punishment - Arrest without warrant - Penalties Suspension or revocation of license.
(2) (a) A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle within this
state if the person:
(i) has sufficient alcohol in the person's body that a subsequent chemical test shows that
the person has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at the time
of the test;
(ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined influence of alcohol and
any drug to a degree that renders the person incapable of safely operating a vehicle[.]

41-6-4430 Seizure and impoundment of vehicles by peace officers - Impound
requirements - Removal of vehicle by owner.
(1) If a peace officer arrests or cites the operator of a vehicle for violating Section 41-644 , 41-6-44.6 , or 41-6-44.10 , or a local ordinance similar to Section 41-6-44 which
complies with Subsection 41-6-43 (1), the peace officer shall seize and impound the
vehicle in accordance with Section 41-6-102.5 , except as provided under Subsection (2).

(2) If a registered owner of the vehicle, other than the operator, is present at the time of
arrest, the peace officer may release the vehicle to that registered owner, but only if:
(a) the registered owner:
(i) requests to remove the vehicle from the scene; and
(ii) presents to the peace officer sufficient identification to prove ownership of the vehicle
or motorboat;
(b) the registered owner identifies a driver with a valid operator's license who:
(i) complies with all restrictions of his operator's license; and
(ii) would not, in the judgment of the officer, be in violation of Section 41-6-44 ,41-644.6 , or 41-6-44.10 , or a local ordinance similar to Section 41-6-44 which complies with
Subsection 41-6-43 (1), if permitted to operate the vehicle; and
(c) the vehicle itself is legally operable.
(3) If necessary for transportation of a motorboat for impoundment under this section, the
motorboat's trailer may be used to transport the motorboat.
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT,
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

SECOND AMENDED FINDINGS OF
FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND
ORDER

-vsROBERT N. DESPAIN,

Case No. 041904962

Defendant.

JUDGE DENISE POSSE LINDBERG

Having heard the facts of this case and having heard argument by both parties, the Court
enters the following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On May 6, 2004, Deputy Edward Spotten of the Salt Lake County Sheriffs
Office was dispatched to 2660 South 8000 West on a reported traffic accident.

2.

Arriving upon the scene at approximately 6:25 p.m., Deputy Spotten observed
that a 2001 Blue Saturn SL2 was the vehicle involved in the accident.

3.

Deputy Spotten observed that this was a single car accident and the car had
crashed into the back end of a parked trailer off the side of the road.

4.

Deputy Spotten encountered the defendant, Robert Nicholas Despain, who was
the driver of the vehicle. Deputy Spotten also encountered three other witnesses.

/

Deputy Spotten approached the defendant to ask some questions. At this time,
the defendant was leaning against the trailer, hi response to Deputy Spotten's
questions, the defendant denied having consumed alcohol or having used any
drugs.
Deputy Spotten noticed that the defendant's speech was slurred while he was
speaking with him.
Deputy Spotten did not smell the odor of alcohol nor marijuana emanating from
the defendant.
Deputy Spotten did not observe drugs or paraphernalia in "plain view" prior to
the search.
The three other witnesses, Brett Lowe, Sasha Strasburg, and Marsha Gallyer,
described to Deputy Spotten what they had observed. They told Deputy Spotten
that they had observed the defendant driving erratically that prior to striking the
parked trailer. Specifically, they indicated that the defendant ran another car off
the road, ran over a reflector post, nearly hit a semi tractor trailer, and was
swerving across the entire road.
After speaking with the witnesses, Deputy Spotten decided that he had probable
cause to arrest the defendant for Driving Under the Influence ("DUI") based on
the defendant's reported driving pattern, the accident, and his demeanor.
Deputy Spotten determined that based on probable cause to arrest the
defendant DUI, the car would be searched "incident to arrest" and "for inventory
purposes" because the vehicle was to be impounded.
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Deputy Spotten did not place the defendant under arrest immediately because Salt
Lake County Fire Department medical personnel had arrived and had placed the
defendant in the ambulance to treat the cut on the defendant's head that he had
sustained from the accident.
Because Salt Lake County Fire was preparing to transport the defendant to the
hospital, Deputy Spotten chose not to administer field sobriety tests.
Medical personnel indicated to Deputy Spotten that the defendant was acting
paranoid. They indicated that he was continually worried about his car.
Medical personnel told Deputy Spotten that the defendant had locked his car to
keep people out.
Deputy Spotten retrieved the keys for the car from the defendant to perform a
search of the car.
Deputy Spotten believes that he told the defendant that he was under arrest when
he retrieved the keys, but does not recall.
After unlocking the car but before performing the search, two individuals, one
male and one female, claiming to be related to the defendant arrived on the scene.
These individuals went to the car and the male attempted to retrieve a backpack
from the back seat.
Deputy Spotten instructed the male to stop and return the backpack to the car.
Sergeant Jason Mazuran of the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office also responded
to the scene.
Sergeant Mazuran interacted and observed the defendant.
Sergeant Mazuran described the defendant's behavior as panicked.

\ 'J

n

In order to assist deputy Spotten, Sergeant Mazuran initiated an inventory search
of the vehicle,
The search of the vehicle commenced at approximately 6:45 p.m.
Sergeant Mazuran characterized the searcli of the vehicle as an inventory search,
in preparation for the vehicle's State Tax Impoundment.
Sergeant Mazuran was aware of the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office procedure
for impounding vehicles.
The policy required that the vehicle be searched, items be located and listed on an
inventory.
As he found particular items in the vehicle, Sergeant Mazuran took those items to
Deputy Spotten, and indicated orally where the items had been found.
Sergeant Mazuran did not personally record in writing the specific items found or
where they were found.
Sergeant Mazuran did not personally prepare a vehicle impound report in this
case, but another deputy on the scene did.
While Sergeant Mazuran began the search, medical personnel indicated to Deputy
Spotten that they were ready to transport the defendant. Deputy Spotten followed
the ambulance to the hospital.
Prior to Deputy Spotten's departure, Deputy Mazuran discovered a bag of
marijuana in the door compartment on the driver's side.
Deputy Spotten stayed in the defendant's presence at all times at the hospital.
After medical personnel were finished, Deputy Spotten clearly remembers placing
the defendant under arrest. This was at approximately 7:20 p.m.

Sergeant Mazurarf s search of the vehicle produced a backpack and a box.
Sergeant Mazuran's search of the backpack produced marijuana that was prepared
for distribution.
Deputy Mazuran's search of the box produced a quantity of methamphetamine.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Deputy Spotten had probable cause to arrest the defendant for Driving Under the
Influence, The probable cause was based on the erratic driving pattern reported
by the witnesses, the single car accident with a stationary trailer that was off the
road, the defendant's panicked and paranoid demeanor, and the defendant's
slurred speech.
The defendant was not actually placed under arrest at the scene; rather, he was
placed under arrest at the hospital.
The State's theory of'search incident to arrest" under these facts is not consistent
with Utah case law7.
There was probable cause to impound the car pursuant to Utah Code § 41-6-44.6
and §41-6-44.30.
Insufficient information was presented to the Court to allow7 it to conclude, one
way or another, whether the inventory search was done according to policy.
The State must show7 that the inventory search was done according to policy.
The State has failed to carry its burden of showing that the inventory search was
properly carried out.
However, had the vehicle been towed to the impound lot and a proper inventory
search been conducted, the contraband would have been inevitably discovered.

m

ORDER
It is hereby ordered that Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence is DENIED.
SIGNED this 16thday of December, 2005.

BY THE COURT:

JUDGE DENISE POSSE LINDBER'
Third Judicial District Court Jud°e *
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